Southern Methodist University

SMU Scholar
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

1983

Perspectives on the United States' Banking System
Joseph J. Norton
Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law

Recommended Citation
Joseph J. Norton, Perspectives on the United States' Banking System, 12 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 1 (1983)

This document is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of SMU
Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

ANGL O-AMERICAN LAW RE VIEW

PERSPECTIVES ON THE UNITED STATES' BANKING SYSTEM*
By JOSEPH JUDE NORTON**

I. INTRODUCTION
Banking law is traditionally thought of as an extension of commercial
law and principles. While the commercial law aspect remains
important, United States' banking laws have become subsumed
under a maze of legislation and governmental regulation. An understanding of this legislative and regulatory framework is essential for
both US and foreign transactors, particularly as foreign investment
and banking activities in the United States continue to increase. For
example, certain of the recent major banking acquisitions in the
United States have been effected by British and Continental European banks, and virtually all major foreign banks have numerous
offices in the United States and are expanding their commercial
activities and services
The primary purpose of this article is to provide the foreign transactor with guidance on the United States' banking system. After
discussion of the historical development of the banking laws and
their traditional objectives, the main current issues and concerns in
the US banking industry will be considered, with particular emphasis
on the interrelated problems of regulatory division and bank
"deregulation. "

*This article is based in part upon a recently published book entitled Banking Law Manual,
by Mr Norton and Ms S. C. Whitley, published by Matthew Bender Publications. The
author and publisher reserve all copyrights.
Unless otherwise indicated, the law reflected herein is at October 15, 1982, the effective
date of the Garn-St Germain Repository Institutions Act of 1982. The reader should be
aware that this Act contemplates various significant implementary regulations most of
which should be in effect at the time of publication of this article, but which could not be
reflected herein.
**LL.B. (Edinburgh). LL.M. (Texas). SJD(Michigan). Diplome (Hague); Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
To appreciate the regulatory complexity of the US banking system
and the "deregulation" process now occurring, an understanding of
the historical context of banking regulations is helpful.

A. The First Banks
In colonial days, the corporate entity was a suspect creature 2. This
distrust, based in large measure upon agrarian opposition, spilled
over to banking institutions. Those corporate financial institutions
which existed in colonial days were dissimilar to their present day
counterparts 3 .
However, with the American Revolution, new economic pressures
and requirements were made on the colonies. Responding to these
pressures and requirements, the Continental Congress, in 1781,
conferred a perpetual charter on the Bank of North America, which
was established as a bank of deposit, discount, and issue. Because of
uncertainties surrounding this charter, the Bank of North America
accepted, contemporaneously with its perpetual charter, a state
charter under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania. This bank was
the first true American bank4 .
While enjoying economic success, political opposition to the Bank
of North America forced the repeal of its perpetual charter in 1785,
thereby restricting its authority to its Pennsylvania state charter. For
this, and other reasons, the Bank of North America (which continued
in business 147 years before being absorbed into the First Pennsylvania'
Banking and Trust Company) neve- achieved the status of a central
bank5 .
The Constitution of the United States contains no express reference,
to the authority of the federal government with respect to banking
institutions. Despite this silence, individuals like Alexander Hamilton
exerted considerable influence upon President Washington in
arguing for the economic necessity and the constitutionality of' a
national bank 6 . In 1791, Congress enacted a Bill, which the President:
consented to, establishing the First Bank of the United States, with a;
20-year charter 7 . In addition to its 20-year life, some of the more
important provisions of the charter of this Bank were: (i) $10 million
in capital, of which the federal government would subscribe to onefifth, (ii) a board of 25 directors, (iii) bank debts could not exceed.
bank capital, (iv) prohibition on the purchase and sale of goods or:
real estate not acquired as forfeited collateral, (v) prohibition on
purchase of federal government stock, and (vi) restriction of bank
interest rates not to exceed 6 per cent on loans and discounts: 1 Stat.
192 (1791).
By the time its charter expired in 1811, the First Bank of the
United States appears to have evolved toward a central bank, by.
making significant loans to the government, co-operating with the,
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US Treasury in assisting state banks, and circulating its own notes
which were becoming a uniform currency for the nation. Moreover,
in economic terms, the Bank appears to have been a success. This
growth of functions and economic success, however, only added to
the strong populist, anti-bank fear of uhdue concentration of financial
power. This sentiment blocked the rechartering of the Bank in 18118.
For the five-year period before 1816, there was no national bank
in the United States. With this void, and also with the demands of
the War of 1812, there arose an increase in state banking activities.
State banks had existed since 1784 with the organization of the Bank
of New York and of the Massachusetts Bank. By 1809, there were
approximately 75 state banks in existence, with no reported bank
failures9 .
It is estimated that between 1811 and 1816 bank-note circulation
through state banks increased from $28 million to $68 million. An
over-issue of bank notes led to a depreciation in value of these notes,
which contributed to an increase in prices, particularly as no taxes
were exacted to reduce the excess currency. In addition, this overissue and the absence of a national bank to provide assistance, led to
a number of bank failures' 0 .
The Second Bank ofrthe United States was chartered in 1816,
however, this Bank appears to have been plagued from the beginning
With a series'of pioblems, fhe least 6f which-vWas initial mismanagmen I . The validity of the Second Bank's charter and the constittitiorialityofthe-federal government's'authority to create a national
bank was challenged in the case of M'Culloch v. Maryland: 17 US
(4-Wheat.)--316.;-.4.-L--Ed:..579..(1819). In -this case, Chief Justice
Marshall went into considerable detail to provide a constitutional
basis supporting the establishment -of-the Bank, -relying primarily,
upon the necessary and proper clause and the money and war powers
granted -by the -Constitution to the. national government. The -Bank
was determined to be "a convenient, a useful and essential instrument'.'- in the -furtherance of the-federal government's fiscal operations.
The constitutionality of the bank was again upheld by the Supreme
Court in its 1824 decision of Osborne v. Bank of the United States : 22 US
(9 Wheat.) 738; 6 L. Ed. 204 (1824).
Notwithstanding its constitutionality and an improved management,
President Jackson, in 1832, vetoed the bill for the Second Bank's
recharter, with the charter expiring in 1836. Thus, the Second Bank
of the United States was compelled to discontinue its operations as a
federal entity, to sell its branches, and to pursue its business under a
restrictive Pennsylvania state charter. It continued as a state bank
for only four years, failing in 184112 .
B. The Rise of State and "Free" Banking
Between 1836 to 1863, there existed no national bank and essentially
no federal currency. The primary form of currency was issued by
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state chartered banks'3 . The authority of a state to charter banks
had been upheld by the Supreme Court in its decision in Briscoe v.
Bank of Kentucky: 36 US (11 Peters) 257; 19 L. Ed. 709 (1837).
This period became known as the "free banking" era. Traditionally
banks, as other corporate entities, were organized under special
legislative charters. Such special chartering practices, however,
came under sharp attack and political pressure for an "enabling"
procedure increased'4 . An "enabling" procedure meant any person
or group complying with the statute could incorporate a bank without
the necessity of any special legislation.
The New York legislature was the first to consider a bank enabling
Act. However, the first "free banking" Act was adopted by Michigan
in 1837 (based on the New York plan), followed by New York in
1838'. Thereafter. "enabling" acts for bank incorporation became
prevalent in the United States, and provided the model for a charter
of a national bank under the National Bank Act of 1863.
The success of the free-banking system varied from state to state.
Certain states saw a significant increase in bank failures and others
witnessed "wildcat" banking. In some states the reaction against
banks became so dramatic that, for example,
in 1845 the Texas
Constitution expressly outlawed banks' 6 . However, other states at
an early stage endeavoured to adopt responsible safety mechanisms.
In fact, as early as 1829, the State of New York had accepted the
New York Safety Fund System under which any bank applying for a
new charter or a renewal of an existing charter was required to
contribute one-half of one percent of its capital for a six year period
to a fund used to aid insolvent banks. In this sense, the New York
Safety Fund System may be viewed as a predecessor of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation. The System also placed limitations
on bank note issues and loans and created a governmental examination
structure for state banks' 7 . From 1834 through 1863, the number of
state banks increased from 506 to 146618 .
During this "free-banking" era there were various unsuccessful
attempts to reinstitute a national banking system' 9 .
C. National Bank Act of 1863 - Dual Banking System
In 1861, and again in 1862, the Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon
P. Chase, in his annual reports presented compelling arguments for
the creation of a uniform currency and a national banking system. In
January 1863, President Lincoln urged Congress to accept this
position 2'. Secretary Chase persuaded Senator John Sherman to
introduce and sponsor the banking bill, which was ultimately passed
by Congress and signed into law on February 25, 1863: 12 Stat. 665.
This Act, originally known as the Sherman Act, established a
single authority, named the Comptroller of the Currency
("Comptroller"), to provide the formation of national banks. The
Sherman Act was repealed and replaced in its entirety by an Act of
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June 3, 1864, which subsequently has become known as the National
Bank Act: 13 Stat. 99. The National Bank Act is, today, primarily
located within Ch. 2 of Title XII of the US Code, but various provisions are scattered throughout other parts of Title XII and other
Titles of the Code 21 .
In addition to the provision for the Comptroller, the main features
of the 1864 Act were the establishment of reserve requirements, the
prohibition of loans on a bank's own stock, the limitation of loans to
any single borrower, the subjection of national banks to examination,
the limitation of interest rates on loans made by national banks, and
a procedure for conversion of state banks to national banks. The
chartering procedures for a national bank were-of an "enabling"
character- 2 .
In an effort to put an end to the issuing of paper currency by state
banks and otherwise to limit the state banking systems, Congress
imposed a 10 percent tax on the amount of any state bank notes paid
out by any national or state bank after July 1, 1866: 13 Stat. 484
(1865). This legislation was re-enacted in 1866 and was held constitutional by the Supreme Court in its 1869 decision in Veazie Bank v.
I'enno: 75 US (8 Wall) 533; 19 L. Ed. 482. The continuance of this
tax effectively resulted in stopping the issue and circulation of state
bank currency. Also, it resulted in a significant number of conversions
of state banks to national banks. In fact, by 1868 there were only
247 state banks in existence.
State banks, however, began to readapt their operations to obtain
funds from the solicitation of deposits, rather than through the issue
of notes. Moreover, the provisions of state laws permitting branch
banking and the exercise of trust powers (powers at that time not
accorded national banks) provided additional bases for a resurgence
of state banking. By 1890 state banks achieved a numerical preeminence over national banks, a fact that has continued to the
present date 21 :
D. The Federal Reserve System
The banking system that emerged from the National Banking Act
was not a panacea. There was a widespread financial crisis in 1873
and a more limited one in 1884 with respect to New York. Indeed,
financial crises arose during the 1890s and came to a head with the
financial panic of 190724.
Congress reacted to the 1907 panic by passing the Aldrich-Vreeland
Act, which established a National Monetary Commission to study
these problems and to make recommendations: 35 Stat. 546 (1908).
The initial conclusions of this Monetary Commission called for the
establishment of a single banking authority with central banking
functions. However, the Commission's ultimate conclusion recommended a regional bank system, as it was thought best suited to the
diverse conditions of the nation: House Report No. 1593, 62nd
Cong., 3rd Sess., 2 (1912).
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The Monetary Commission's report led to the enactment of the
Federal Reserve Act: 38 Stat. 251 (1913). The preamble of the Act,
as originally passed, stated that its purpose was "To provide for the
establishment of federal reserve banks, to furnish an elastic currency,
to afford means of rediscount and commercial paper, to establish a
more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for
other purposes".
E. Major Legislation in the 1930s.
The financial crisis of the 1920s and the bank crises of 1932 and 1933
led to the enactment of a series of legislation which have had a profound impact upon the present structure of bank regulation.
After long and vigorous debate, the Banking Act of 1933 (48 Stat.
162 known then in its entirety as the "Glass-Steagall" Act) became
law in IJune of that year 25 .Section 16 of this Act required a complete divorce between commercial bankinj and investment banking
functions. The underlying philosophy was that investment banking
was an inherently risky and speculative venture and, therefore, was
an improper pursuit for banks which had the responsibility of protecting the deposits of the general public. This dichotomy is one of the
major current issues in commercial banking and investment banking 6 .
The Banking Act of 1933 also established the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") for the purpose of protecting
bank depositors, helping to maintain confidence in the banking
system, and promoting safe and sound banking practices 27 . This
was the first time the federal government had entered into the deposit
insurance business. All national banks and other member banks of
the Federal Reserve System ("FRS") were required to obtain this
insurance, which was also available to other state banks upon application and qualification. With the creation of the FDIC, the third
major federal bank supervisory agency came into existence 28 . This
"trifurcation" of authority remains the essential federal regulatory
structure existing today with respect to commercial banks 29 .
The year after the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 (which
provided disclosure and registration procedures for the public distribution of securities, as to which banking securities were generally
exempt (48 Stat. 74; 15 USC No. 77a, et seq.)). Congress enacted
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: 48 Stat. 881 (1934); 15 USC
No. 78a, et seq. This Act authorized the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors ("FRB") to regulate and to limit the amount of credit
that may be extended for purchasing and carrying securities registered
on national exchanges or FRB designated "over-the-counter"
margin stocks (ie, "margin securities"). This authority covered not
only brokers and broker-dealers and others who trade in stock, but
also all bank loans extended for purposes of financing the purchase
or carrying of "margin" securities: 15 USC § 78 (g) and (h).
The 1934 Securities Exchange Act, was subsequently amended in
1964, and required banks and other entities, with widely distributed
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stock, to disclose, for public record and on a continuing basis, certain.
detailed financial and other information in the interest of protecting
the investing public 30 . Jurisdiction was divided among the Comptroller, the FRS and the FDIC, according to the nature of the bank
involved.
In addition, the 1975 amendments to the Securities Act made
further extensive amendments to the 1934 Act by subjecting banks
to provisions relating to (i) institutional investment manager reports,
(ii) municipal securities dealers, (iii) stolen and counterfeit securities,
(iv) clearing agencies and transfer agencies, and (v) prohibition
against the combination of brokerage and money management 31 .
In 1935, Congress passed the Banking Act, which extended the
regulatory power of the FRS by requiring state banks with deposits
in excess of $1 million to be members and restructured the FRB into
a seven-member board of governors (disqualifying membership by
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency).
This Act also empowered the FRB to determine reserve requirements
for member banks respecting time and savings deposits: 49 Stat.
684 (1935). The aspect of the Act requiring state membership was
subsequently repealed: 53 Stat. 842 (1939).
The 1930s also evidenced the establishment of the US present
federal systems respecting savings and loan associations ("S & Ls")
and credit unions. In 1932, the Federal Home Loan Bank Act was
passed, which established the Federal Home Loan Bank Board:
("FHLBB") and the Federal Home Loan Bank System ("FHLBS"):
47 Stat. 725; 12 USC, §1421, et seq. The Home Owner's Loan
Act of 1933 provided the basic framework for the Federal Savings
and Loan System ("FSLS") by providing for the federal charter
of S & Li and supervision by the FHLBB: 48 Stat. 128; 12 USC
No. 1461. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Company
("FSLIC") was in turn established under Title IV of the National
Housing Act of 1934: 48 Stat. 1255; 12 USC, S 1724, et seq.
The Federal Credit Union Act of 1934 was designed "to establish
a Federal Credit Union System, to establish a further market for
securities of the United States and make more available to people of
small means credit for provident purposes through a national system
of co-operative credit, thereby helpinq to stabilize the credit structure"
of the United States": 48 Stat. 1216; 12 USC, no. 1751, et seq.
Thus, from the depths of the Depression, rose a strengthened
FRS, a newly created FDIC, and a powerful Comptroller. In addition,
federal systems for S & Ls and credit unions were established. Along
side these federal regulatory structures, however, remained strong
state-banking systems. The "dual banking" system, as well as the
division of regulatory authority on the federal level, was firmly in place.
F. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended
(BHCA)
The BHCA, as enacted in 1956, was the first comprehensive federal
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legislation dealing with bank holding companies 32 . The BHCA gave
the FRB responsibility for the administration of the Act, and, as
amended in 1966 (Public Law 89-485; 80 Stat. 236, 237) and
19703', this Act endeavours to control bank holding company
expansion to avoid the creation of monopoly or restraint of trade of
banking and to allow bank holding companies to expand into nonbanking activities related to banking while maintaining a separation
between banking and commerce. As originally enacted, the BHCA
exempted one-bank holding companies from regulation. However,
with the increased use of the one-bank holding company in the late
1960s by many large banks, the Act was amended in 1970 to embrace
all one-bank holding companies. Use of bank holding companies has
continued to increase in popularity for a variety of reasons, particularly as it (i) provides banks with a functional alternative'to branch
banking in states where branching is prohibited, (ii) facilitates interstate bank activities, and (iii) enhances a banking group's ability to
provide bank-related and non-bank services 34 .
G. The 1960s - Rise of Civil Rights and Consumer
Legislation
The 1960s saw a spate of civil rights orientated legislation, which,
directly or indirectly, affected the operations of banks 35 . This legislation foreshadowed consumer protection legislation. For example,
in 1968, the Consumer Credit Protection Act, the primary title of
which was the Truth-In-Lending Act (TILA), was enacted: Public
Law 90-321; 82 Stat. 146. It required creditors for the first time to
state cost of borrowings in uniform terms, so a consumer could
assess the cost of credit and could shop for credit. This legislation
provided the basis for substantial consumer legislation in the 1970s.
The 1960s also saw the enactment of (i) the Bank Merger Act of
1960, which amended the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to provide
safeguards against mergers or consolidations that might be anticompetitive or monopolistic Public Law: 86-463; 74 Stat. 129; 12
USC § 1828 (c); (ii) the Financial Institution Supervisory Act of
1966, which strengthened the powers of the federal banking authorities in ensuring sound and effective operations of these banks (eg,
through cease and desist orders and suspension and removal orders:
Public Law 89-695; 80 Stat. 1028); and (iii) the enactment of the
Interest Rate Control Act of 1966, which permitted the FHLBB to
impose interest rate ceilings on banking institutions under its supervision: Public Law 89-597; 80 Stat. 823.
H. The 1970s - A Social Agenda and Commencement of
"Deregulation"
The early 1970s saw the commencement of Congressional discussions
of the restructuring and deregulation of the banking industry.
However, before Congress came actively to consider these matters,
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it faced a number of "social" issues affecting bank activities. Though
such issues stalled the deregulation scheme, they did lay a necessary
social underpinning to this eventual scheme.
The 1970s brought significant banking regulation in the area of
consumer protection.
1 Equal Credit OpportunityAct of 1974, as amended. The Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA) is often described as the first civil rights
statute to deal with consumer credit. The thrust of this Act is to
ensure that all consumers and businesses have the right to an equal
opportunity to obtain credit. A creditor cannot discriminate against
an applicant for credit on the basis of race, colour, religion, national
origin, sex, marital status, age, receipt of public assistance benefits
or exercise of consumer credit rights. The Act applies to all persons
who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly participate in
decisions whether or not to extend credit or regularly refer applicants
to creditors 36 .
The ECOA comes within the regulatory authority of the FRB,
which in turn has established a Consumer Advisory Council 'to
advise and consult with the FRB in the exercise of its functions under
the Act. The Act is implemented by the FRB through its Regulation
B, which became effective on March 23, 1977: 12 CFR §202..
2. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA). The CRA was designed
as an integral part of the over-all scheme of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, with its primary objective being
to encourage more co-ordinated efforts between private investment,
federal grants and insurance to increase the viability of urban
communities3 7 . This legislation was directed, in part, against the
so-called practice of "red-lining," that is, the conscious or unconscious
use of funds, deposited by residents in neighbourhood institutions,
outside the neighbourhood or without benefiting the depositors of
the neighbourhood 3 8 .
CRA's objectives are more normative than regulatory. This Act
does not establish specific requirements for bank performance, but
seeks to use the bank examination process as a device for fostering
acceptable "standards" of performance by placing an affirmative
obligation upon a bank to help meet the credit needs of the local
community served by it. The standard for assessing the over-all
performance in meeting these credit needs is subjective. This standard
is whether each institution serves "the convenience and needs of the
community in which it is chartered to do business." The concept of
"convenience and needs" includes "the need for credit services as
39
well as deposit services."
While appearing innocuous in wording, the CRA has, however,
been used as a powerful tool by the federal regulators in assessing
"applications" from regulated financial institutions. For example,
with respect to a national bank, the term "application" would
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include, among other matters an application to the Comptroller for a
charter for a national bank, and for mergers or acquisitions. In
assessing such an application, regulators may consider the bank's
record of meeting the credit needs of its community, including low
and moderate income neighbourhoods, all consistent with a "safe
and sound" operation" .
The CRA is administered by the various federal regulatory
authorities with respect to banks over which they have supervisory
authorities. Each of these federal authorities has issued implementing regulations respecting the CRA4 .
3. Electronic Fund TransferAct of 1978 (EFTA). The EFTA, enacted
as Title XX of FIRA, is designed to protect consumers in the use of
electronic fund-transfer services 42 . Such services could include uses
of automated teller machines, point of sale terminals, preauthorized
payments and credits, cheque guarantees, telephone authorized payments, and wire transfers. The Act endeavours to provide the basic
framework establishing the rights, liabilities and responsibilities of
the participants in electronic-fund transfer systems. The over-all
objective is to provide the individual consumer or user with protection
and rights comparable to those provided in other circumstances by
existing legislation 4 3 . The FRB has regulatory responsibility for
implementing this Act, and its implementing regulation is controlling: FRB Regulation E, 12 CFR, §205.
4. Other Consumer-RelatedLegislation. There were also major amendments to the Consumer Protection Act (including Fair Credit Reporting Act 4 4 and TILA Amendments)4 5 , major real estate related legislation (eg, Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act 4 6 , Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act 47 and Housing and Community Development Act) , and enactment of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act 4 9 .

I. International Banking Act of 1978 (IBA)
Before the enactment of the IBA in 1978, there was effectively no
federal regulation concerning foreign banking operations in the
United States5". The IBA recognizes the internationalization of US
money markets and banking activities by attempting to create a
regulatory framework with respect to foreign bank entry and participation while endeavouring to achieve regulatory parity for domestic
and foreign banks in their US operations"1 . The IBA also was used
to amend the Edge Act by eliminating requirements that have
adversely affected the lending capacity of Edge Act corporations (ie,
international banking corporations in which national and state
member banks of the FRS may purchase stock and which may
engage in a number of international banking and foreign financial
activities, subject to the restrictions contained in FRB Regulation
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K)5 2 . In addition, recent FRB regulations under the IBA permit the
creation of international banking facilities (IBFs). United States
and foreign banks may establish IBFs in the US to handle foreign
international banking free of domestic legal reserve requirements
and interest rate controls: 46 FR 32426 (June 23, 1981).
J. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control
Act of 1978 (FIRA)
With the exception of the 1980 Omnibus Banking Act and the 1982
Banking Act (both discussed in Part V below), FIRA may be the
most significant piece of banking legislation since the 1930s: Public
Law 95-630; 92 Stat. 3641 (1978). The purposes of this Act are
omnibus in nature: and include such significant pieces of legislation
as the Change in Bank Control Act of 1978, Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 19785 3 and EFTA. The most notable impact of FIRA
on bank activity is its restrictions on inside and affiliated bank transactions, inspired by the alleged indiscretions of Bert Lance, former
director of the Office for the Management of the Budget in the
Carter Administration 4 . However, in long-term significance, FIRA
initiated the statutory "deregulation scheme." For example, Title
VII of FIRA commenced the broadening of the loan and investment
powers of federal S & Ls.
III. REVIEW OF BANKING OBJECTIVES
To understand present US banking legislation and to discern the
direction and impact of future legislation, an understanding of some
of the objectives of banking regulation is important. Some of the
traditional banking objectives are:
A. Safety and Soundness
Part of banking regulation has been seen as ensuring the "safety
and soundness" of the banking system. In some instances this
appears to be directed toward protecting the individual depositor
from a loss on a deposit balance; however, with the institution of
federal deposit insurance, this concern has been greatly minimized.
In other instances, the term appears to be concerned with prevention
of bank failures, which in turn could result in an undermining of
confidence in the banking system. In still other instances, it appears
to be directed toward preventing major disruptions in the money
supply. In fact, one federal court suggests that the progressive
definition of the term rests with the expertise of the appropriate
regulatory agencies"5 . This suggestion appears to be supported by
the fact that the major statutes (eg, FIRA, 1980 Omnibus Banking
Act, and the 1982 Banking Act) laying the deregulation framework
do not expressly confront the safety and soundness issue, but appear
to deal with it by increasing the powers and sanctions of the federal
bank regulations.
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To achieve the "safety and soundness" of the banking system,
banking regulators, on both a federal and state level, often direct
themselves to a number of common matters.
1. Control of "excessive" competition. Banking regulation traditionally
has been protective in nature. While competition among banking
institutions had not been entirely discouraged; the regulations, at
least until recent times, endeavoured to control excessive competition.
This goal has been met by statutorily separating the power of differing types of banking institutions and by controlling the entry of
banks through chartering and branching regulations. This approach
toward the control of competition is presently under serious questioning by Congress and the courts5 6 .
2. Deposit rate ceilings. In the past, unfettered competition among
banks for deposits was seen as a cause of economic difficulties. If
deposit interest rates were permitted to float with the market then, as
such rates increased, banks would seek riskier investments or loans
in order to generate appropriate earnings. This rationale was directly
associated with the 1933 legislative prohibition of payment of interest
on the demand deposits and conferring authority for prescribing
ceilings rates for time and safety deposits (12 USC %%
371a and
3.71b) and with the rationale tor the promulgation of' FRB Regulat ion
Q: 12 CFR §217. Differentials in deposit rate ceilings, however,
were permitted under Regulation Q for dillering banking institutions
to protect the continuing existence of certain of these institutions and
to encourage their specific objectives. For example, federal S & Ls
have been permitted by law to pay higher rates of intrest oi itne
deposits than have national banks. The 1980 Omnibus Act, as
modified by the 1982 Banking Act (see \' below,), requires the
elimination of interest rate differentials under FRB Regulation Q
between thrift institutions and commercial banks by January I,
1984 and of the other aspects of Regulation Q by March 1, 198(6.
3. Control over portfolio. Banking regulation has often been concerned
with the riskiness of certain types of loans and investments. For
example, until the 1982 Banking Act there had been extensive
regulation of real estate loans with respect to national banks and
federally chartered S & Ls, placing limitations on the ratio of loan
amounts for appraised value, maturity, amortization, and location
of the security $7 . With respect to bank investments, regulations
have generally been designed to limit banks to purchase of government debt securities, and to prohibit them (with certain exceptions)
from equity securities: 12 USC 524 (Seventh). The 1982 Banking
Act appears to be moving towards easing or eliminating statutory
restrictions on portfolio controls and toward conferring upon the
federal banking authorities discretionary regulatory power in this
area.
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4. Borrowing Limits. Another form of portfolio regulation concerns
the amount of credit a bank can extend to a single borrower.
Historically, this so-called "single borrower limitation" was justified
as a credit allocation device; however, today, justification rests more
on diversifying risk. For a national bank (with the new 1982 Banking
Act amendments), the limit is (subject to a number of statutory
exceptions) 15 per cent of bank capital and surplus respecting
unsecured loans and extensions of credit,plus, an additional 10 per
cent for loans secured by marketable collateral having a reliable and
continuously available price quotation: 12 USC §84, as amended
by §401 of the 1982 Banking Act.
'B. Reserve Requirements
The historical theory behind statutory reserve requirements was
enhancement of a bank's liquidity in order to meet its current
liabilities. This rationale has come to be overshadowed by the use of
reserve requirements by the FRS in implementing monetary policy.
National banks, like state member banks and other depository
institutions, are required to maintain the reserve requirements for
''transaction accounts" (as distinguished from time accounts such as
savings accounts) set by the FRB within a statutorily and regulatorily
prescribed range 8 . With the rise of non-bank financial intermediaries
offering transactions such as "cash management accounts," the FRB
is monitoring the possible impact on the national money supply, with
the existence of a significant effect probably leading to Congressional
or regulatory efforts to apply reserve requirements to any such
methods.
C. Capital Requirements
Every federal and state banking statute sets forth minimum capital
requirements. In theory, this is to protect depositors; however,
statutory requirements are static in nature and over a period often
bear no relationship to a bank's over-all balance sheet as it grows5 9 .
D. Investor Protection
The concept of investor protection does not appear to be deeply
ingrained as an objective of bank regulation. The main emphasis of
bank supervision is directed toward the bank customers. As the
ownership of banks has diversified, the need for investor protection
has grown. Presently, banks and bank holding companies, having $3
million or more in assets and having 500 or more shareholders, are
subject to continuing disclosure requirements of the 1934 Securities
Act, with enforcement divided among the SEC and the various
federal banking authorities. Moreover, while the public offerings of
bank stock remain exempt from registration in the 1933 Securities
Act, the various federal and banking authorities have their own
disclosure requirements for such distributions, which are substantially
similar to the SEC requirements6".
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In addition, under FIRA, legislative concern was expressed for
the possibility of abuse in inside transactions within the banking
system. These provisions can be justified on a number of grounds,
including investor protection. Other grounds would be prevention of
unsafe and unsound practices and the safeguarding of depositors.
Further, the Change In Bank Control Act of 1978, under FIRA,
provides a form of shareholder protection by requiring advance
notice to the appropriate federal banking agency of any transfer of 25
per cent or more of the voting stock of a federally insured bank or its
holding company: 12 USC 1817 (j) (7).
With banks now being permitted to offer depository instruments
"equivalent to and competitive with" money market mutual funds
and with pressures continuing for banks or holding company units to
engage in securities activities, concern for "investor protection"
may increase.
E. Credit Allocation
The "single borrower" limitation can be justified on grounds of
credit allocation. A more recent example of credit allocation was
former President Carter's authorization to the FRB, under the
Credit Control Act of 1969 61,to adopt temporary regulation designed
to restrain the expansion of credit 62 . These regulations came into
effect in March 1980 and were lifted in July 1980: 45 FR 46064 (July
9, 1980). More generally, the CRA (directly) and the ECOA (at
least indirectly) can be characterized as legislation directed to credit
allocation.
With present economic conditions causing a "crowding out" of
certain credit users (eg, homebuyers and consumers), pressures will
be on Congress to remain sensitive to credit allocation concerns.
F. Consumer Protection
A recent banking objective deals with consumer protection. The
enactment of the numerous statutes during the 1970s requires banks
to ensure community-wide opportunities for access to banking
services. An example is the CRA, which requires a bank to meet the
credit needs of a community, (including those of low and moderate
income families). The primary example of consumer protection,
however, remains the Truth-In-Lending Act and its numerous
amendments: on CRA and TILA see PartIlI, §H, supra.
In addition, there exist various state and federal laws respecting
usury and loan rate ceilings, which serve as a form of protection to
bank borrowers: see CCH,Consumer Credit Guide, vol. 1, 1301.
G. Community Convenience and Needs
The term "community convenience and needs" has been used in a
number of federal banking statues, dating back to the Bank Act of
1935: 12 OSC S1816. The phrase appears to have been directed
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originally to the requirement that the community be able to support
the bankin.z facility to be chartered. The term is also used under the
Bank Merger Act (12 USC No. 1828 (c) (5) (B)) and the Bank
Holding Act, (12 USC § 1842 (c)) where it appears to be associated
with traditional considerations of competition and sufficient business
to ensure the success of the bank, as distinguished from any inherent
obligation of the bank to the community credit needs. However, it
now appears that under the CRA, a new emphasis has been placed
on the term, which equates it to equal lending practices within a
community.
IV. THE REGULATORY FRAGMENTATION
As evidenced by the discussion in Part II, the development of banking regulation in the United States has been divided and often
disjointed, rooted more in reaction to specific events than in any
coherent economic or legal theory and scheme of regulation. This is
not to say that the present bank regulatory scheme is a result of
historic coincidences; to the contrary, the present division (on the
federal level) is directly attributable to deep and consistent beliefs
respecting a fear of undue concentration of financial power in the.
hands of banks and the ensuing belief that the statutory framework
should separate the various classes of financial institutions. However,
particularly with the "deregulation scheme" (discussed in Part V),
the underpinnings of this federal regulatory system are, more and
more, being called into question. Yet, notwithstanding "deregulation"
and the challenge to the present components of the federal system,
the existence of the dual banking system (ie, federal and state)
appears to be firmly entrenched and to be viewed as "sacrosanct" by
federal legislators.

A. The Setting
As has been discussed in Part II, federal supervision of banks has
ariseii during periods of economic crisis . During the period preceding
1863, state banks, the only type of banks then in existence, issued
notes without uniformity. The chaotic economic conditions brought
about by the Civil War further aggravated the situation with counterfeiting and bank failures becoming prevalent. These conditions led
to the creation of the national bank system in 1863 under the auspices
of the Comptroller 6 3 .
Financial difficulties recurred in 1890, 1893, and in 1907, after
which Congress appointed a National Monetary Commission. The
report of this Commission led to the enactment of the Federal Reserve
Act 64 which created a system of regional Federal Reserve Banks
supervised by the FRB. All national banks are required to be members
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of the FRS and qualified state chartered banks may become members
Between 1913 and 1933 the only division of parallel authority
between the Comptroller and the FRB was with respect to examinations6 5 . The Comptroller examined all national banks and the
FRB examined all state chartered Federal Reserve member banks.
The Banking Act of 1933 expanded parallel authority between
federal banking authorities by requiring Comptroller approval for
investment in bank premises by national banks and by requiring
FRB approval for such investment by state member banks: 48 Stat.
162 §14; 12 USC §371d. The Act also created the FDIC to insure
the deposits of all FRS member banks and qualified state nonmember banks: 48 Stat. 168, ch. 89; 12 USC § 1811.
The Banking Act of 1935 gave the FDIC authority to limit the
payment of interest on deposits by non-member insured state banks
parallel to the FRB's authority with respect to member banks: 48
Stat. 436, ch. 614, §101 (v).( 8 ); 12 USC § 1828 (g). In addition, the
Act trifurcated authority for approval to establish domestic branches
among the federal banking authorities: Banking Act of 1933, 48
Stat. 162, §5 (a) and §338; 12 USC §321.
In the 1950s Congress divided parallel authority among the federal
banking authorities for approval of mergers 66 and reduction of
capital, stock 7 . The only exception to the continued division was in
the area of the regulation of bank holding companies, the federal
authority for which was vested in the FRB: Bank Holding Company
Act 1956, 70 Stat. 133, §5 (b); 12 USC § 1844 (b). Similarly, in
the 1960s Congress expanded the division of authority in the areas of
mergers 68 , bank service corporations 69 , securities issuances 7",
administrative remedies7 1 , lotteries7 2 , bank protection 7 3 , and consumer protection".
In the 1970s Congress continued the pattern of trifurcation as
evidenced primarily by the enactment of various consumer protection
laws 7 5 . In the late 1970s this pattern was followed in anti-trust
matters 7 6 and the change of control of banks 77 .
However, in 1978 Congress enacted FIRA, (92 Stat. 3641) which
interrupted (and, perhaps, brought into question) the divisions by
establishing the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC): 12 USC No.3305. The primary purpose of the FFIEC is
to prescribe uniform principles, standards and reports for the federal
examination of banks by the FRB, the FDIC, the FHLBB, the
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and the Comptroller.
For the first time in the history of the bank regulatory system the
authorities were mandated to promote consistency in federal examinations of banks.
In 1980 Congress established the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee (DIDC) comprised of the federal banking
authorities: 12 USC §3501. The purpose of the DIDC is, under a
unitary committee, to phase out, before January 1, 1984, the interest
rate differential between commercial banks and thrift institutions,
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,and, by January 1, 1986, all interest rate ceilings on all types of
deposits and accounts.
B. Present Regulatory Pattern
The present regulatory system for banks is a "dual banking system"
of state and federal regulation, with the regulation on a federal level
being further divided among various regulatory authorities. As
mentioned above, this system, at least for the foreseeable future,
appears to be firmly in place. The divided federal system of regulation
is also deeply entrenched; but is presently subject to considerable
congressional debate and analysis. For example, Vice President
Bush is presently heading a presidential task force on the matter.
1. Commercial Banks. With respect to commercial banks, there are
various patterns of regulation: (i) national banks are chartered and
supervised by the Comptroller, automatically are members of the
FRS and are insured by the FDIC; (ii) state chartered banks are
regulated by the relevant state bank authority, and may choose to
become members of the FRS, in which case they are automatically
insured by the FDIC; (iii) state banks may, however, choose to
remain outside the FRS but to be insured by the FDIC; and (iv)
state banks, unless otherwise required by state law, may choose to
operate independently from the FRS and the FDIC7 8 .
2. Savings and Loans Associations (S & Ls). With respect to S & Ls,
the patterns of regulation include: (i) federal S and Ls are chartered
and supervised by the FHLBB, automatically are members of the
FSLS and are insured by the FSLIC; (ii) a state chartered S & L
may belong to the FSLS and as a policy matter must secure FSLIC
insurance of accounts in order to secure membership in the FSLS;
(iii) state chartered S & Ls may obtain FSLIC insurance on accounts;
and (iv) a state chartered S & L may choose not to be insured by the
FSLIC or be a member of the FSLS7 9 .
3. Credit Unions. Federal credit unions are chartered and supervised
by the NCUA and must insure their share accounts with the National
Credit Union Share Insurance Fund. Any credit union may join the
NCUA Central Liquidity Facility, a central bank for credit unions.8 0 .
4. Depository Institutions Generally. The FFIEC and DIDC are two
entities which affect all banks and other depository institutions. The
FFIEC is comprised of a representative from the FRB, the FDIC, the

FHLBB, the NCUA, and the Comptroller. As discussed above, the
purpose of the FFIEC is to prescribe uniform principles, standards and
report forms for federal examination of financial institutions: 12 USC
§3305. The DIDC is comprised of the heads of the five bank
regulatory authorities except that the Comptroller is a non-voting
member and the Secretary of the Treasury is an additional member.
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The DIDC's purpose is to provide an orderly phase out and the
ultimate elimination of the limitations on maximum rates of interest
and dividends that may be paid on deposits and accounts: 12 USC
§3501.
C. The Regulators
The primary federal regulators of banking institutions in the United
States are the Federal Reserve System (through the FRB), the
Comptroller and the FDIC. Other regulators exist for S & Ls (eg,
FHLBB and FSLIC and credit unions, eg, National Credit Union
Administrator and the Central Liquidity Fund). The following
briefly discusses the role and functions of FRS, Comptroller and
FDIC 81 .
1. The FederalReserve System (FRS). The FRS is comprised of member banks, twelve Federal Reserve Banks, and the FRB. The FRB
formulates and implements monetary policies and regulates and
supervises member banks and bank holdings companies.
Membership in the FRS consists of all national banks and any
state bank accepted into membership. Each member bank is entitled
to participate in the election of six of the nine directors of the appropriate Federal Reserve Bank. The remaining three directors are
appointed by the FRB. Historically FRS membership has provided
numerous other privileges; however, the enactment of the 1980
Omnibus Banking Act has reduced the privileges of membership by
making many FRS services available to non-members: 94 Stat.
1321.
The twelve Federal Reserve Banks serve separate geographic
districts under the supervision of the FRB. Each bank is incorporated with the Comptroller and is managed by its own Board of
Directors consisting of nine members. Class A directors, who
generally are bankers, and Class B directors who are non-bankers
are elected by member banks in each Federal Reserve District. The
FRB appoints three Class C directors from the public sector and
designates one of them as chairman and one other as deputy chairman of the bank's board. Under the supervision of the FRB the
directors of each Reserve Bank oversee the operations of their bank:
12 USC §5302, 305, 321 and 341.
There are three primary operations each bank performs for the
nation's banks. First, each Bank operates a payment system which,
among other things, clears and collects checks for depository institutions which include United States branches and agencies of foreign
banks, and S & Ls, credit unions, and banks. As a part of the
payment system, a wire transfer network aids banks in transferring
reserve balances, securities, and information. The payment system
also entails the distribution of coin and currency to banks. Second,
each bank extends credit to these depository institutions. Various
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types of credit including short and long term credit are available.
with special consideration for smaller banks that lack access to other
sources of funds. Each bank acts as a fiscal agent of the United
States, its agencies, and certain international agencies82 .
The third component of the FRS is the FRB, which is entrusted
with the over-all responsibility for making and executing monetary
policy and supervising Federal Reserve Banks and the member
banks. Each of the Governors is appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. FRB members are appointed for terms of
14 years and their terms are arranged so that one expires every two
years. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the FRB are named
by the President from the Board members: 12 USC 5§241 and 242.
The _RB is assisted by the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC). The FOMC, comprised of the FRB and five Reserve Bank
presidents, determines the Federal Reserve's conduct in the open
securities market. This Committee authorizes trading of United States
government securities, securities of federal agencies, bankers'
acceptances, and foreign and domestic currencies. The time, character
and volume of the purchases and sales of the trades are conducted so as
to accommodate commerce and business and the credit condition of the
country8 3 .
Two statutorily prescribed advisory councils confer with the FRB.
The 12-member Federal Advisory Council may make presentations to
the FRB on matters within its jurisdiction: 12 USC §261. The
30-member Consumer Advisory Council consults with the FRB
concerning its functions under the Consumer Credit Protection Act
and other consumer related matters: 15 USC No. 1691 (b).
The FRS, primarily through the FRB, is entrusted with two
principle functions: formulation of monetary policy and regulation
responsibilities. The FRB influences national monetary policy in
four ways: (i) participating in the operations of the FOMC, (ii)
issuing rules that govern the administration of Reserve Bank discount
functions, and (iv) setting margin requirements on credit purchases
in the stock market 8 4 '.
The FRB also exercises broad supervisory and regulatory responsibilities over member banks, bank holding companies, and others.
For example, it has authority to formulate and issue regulations that
apply to all member banks. While supervisory authority for nationally
chartered member banks rests with the Comptroller, the FRB directly
supervises state member banks and their affiliates through periodic
examinations: 12 USC §325 et seq.
The FRB also has exclusive federal responsibility for administering the Bank Holding Company Act. This Act was designated to
achieve two basic objectives: (i) to control bank holding company
expansion in order to avoid the creation of a monopoly or restraint
of trade in banking, (ii) to allow bank holding companies to expand
into non-banking activities related to banking " .
Further, it exercises additional supervisory and regulatory respon-.
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sibilities in the areas of mergers (12 USC §1828 (c)), consumer
credit under the TIL (15 USC § 1601 et seq.), unfair or deceptive
acts or practices (15 USC §58 (f)), and international banking
activities (12 USC §601).
With respect to thrift institutions, the federal counterparts to the
S-,R
and FR-B are the Federal Home Loan Bank System and the
(FHLBB)r 6 .
2. Comptroller of the Currency. The Comptroller charters, regulates,
and supervises the operations of national banks. The Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency is a bureau in the Treasury Department.
In contrast to the pervasive authority of the FRB, the Comptroller is
empowered to charter and to supervise and regulate the operations
of national banks8 7 .
He is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for
a term of five years. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to
appoint up to four Deputy Comptrollers to ensure management
succession in the event of absence or disability: 12 USC §§2 and 3.
In addition to granting or denying national bank charters, the
Comptroller also approves certain corporate or structural changes,
including an increase or decrease in capitalization, payment of
dividends, and establishment of a branch or of an operating subsidiary:
12 USC §§30, 36 57 and 60.
The Comptroller appoints National Bank Examiners to report to
him on each national bank's soundness, the quality of management
and directors, and compliance with applicable laws, rules and
regulations. The National Bank Act allows him to examine every
national bank as often as necessary. He may utilize a variety of
administrative remedies in order to regulate national banks some of
which remedies include a civil-money penalty, a cease and desist
order, removal, suspension and prohibition of an individual associated
with the bank, and formal investigation. The Comptroller's authority
also extends to taking possession of the assets of a national bank and
appointing a receiver. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
is funded through assessments based upon the size of each national
bank88 .
3. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation(FDIC). The FDIC insures
bank deposits, supervises insured banks which are not members of
the FRS, and for insured state non-member banks approves applications for structural or corporate changes. The FDIC also serves as
receiver of all "closed" national banks for insured non-member
banks and may serve as receiver for insured state chartered banks8 9 .
The management of the FDIC is vested in a bipartisan threemember board. Two of the directors are appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate for a six-year term. One of the appointed
members is elected Chairman of the Board. The third Board member is
the Comptroller, who, in the absence of an elected chairman, serves
as chairman: 12 USC §1812.
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The FDIC insures the deposits of national banks upon certification by the Comptroller and insures the deposits of state member
banks upon certification by the FRB. State non-member banks must
apply directly to the FDIC for insurance coverage. A branch of a
foreign bank must post a bond or pledge assets sufficient to provide
protection against the risks entailed in insuring the deposits of a
foreign bank whose activities and assets are, for the most part,
outside of the jurisdiction of the United States: 12 USC §§1814
(b) and 1815 (b).
Once a bank is insured, it pays a semi-annual assessment to the
FDIC Insurance Fund. The Fund which is maintained to protect
depositors up to $100,000 is invested in obligations of the United
States or obligations guaranteed as to the principal and interest of
the United States. The FDIC may borrow up to three billion dollars
:"_-ithe United States Treasury for insurance purposes: 12 USC
§1817 (b)(2), 1823 (a)and 1824.
The FDIC conducts regular examinations of insured state nonmember banks and affiliates and review reports of examination
made by the Comptroller, in the case of national banks and by the
FRB in the case of state member banks. The FDIC also must
approve the establishment of a domestic or foreign branch.
Relocation of an insured state non-member bank's main office or
domestic or foreign branch must obtain FDIC consent: 12 USC §§
1817 (a) (2) and 1828 (d) (1) and (2).
Finally, the FDIC serves as receiver for any national bank
declared insolvent by the Comptroller. The FDIC must accept
appointment as receiver for an insured bank if requested by the state
banking authority and permitted by state law: 12 USC § 1821 (c)
and (e). The FDIC's authority to provide direct and merger related
assistance to a troubled bank has been expanded by the 1982.
Banking Act. The FDIC may now authorize mergers across state
lines between dissimilar banking institutions. However, statutory
preference is given to intrastate, similar-institution mergers. This
authority expires three years from the date of enactment9".
For thrift institutions, the federal counterpart of the FDIC is the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.
D. Present Regulatory Debate
Since 1919 when it was proposed that the Comptroller's regulatory
functions be transferred to the FRB, a debate on the consolidation of
federal banking authorities has persisted. The debate has historically
been couched in terms of the three federal commercial bank
regulatory authorities 9 ; but, today, with "deregulation", the
debate embraces the federal regulators of thrift institutions and
credit unions.
There are three principal arguments in favour of a divided federal
regulatory system. First, the system provides flexibility conducive to
innovative banking. Second, the system has worked reasonably well
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and differences among the authorities have been resolved through
Third,
a
consultation,
and
co-operation.
co-ordination,
monopolistic power over banks would lead to abuses, would
eliminate the present system of cheque and balances, and would
destroy the dual banking system.
The principal arguments in favour of a consolidated regulatory
system are that a divided system is inefficient and promotes
"competition in laxity" and thereby encourages shopping for the
most lenient regulator 9 2 . In addition, the cheques and balances
analogy is considered inappropriate as this concept is applicable to
divisions among distinct government branches and not to a single
functional area such as banking regulation 9 3 . Further, a consolidated federal banking authority is viewed as preserving the dual
banking system inasmuch as the state and federal chartering authority
would continue.
In the context of this debate, in the early 1970s two major
comparative studies considered the nature of commercial banks, S
& Ls, credit unions, and considered the fragmented banking
regulations9 4 . One study recognized that the wisdom of integrating
federal regulation of S & Ls with that of commercial banks appears
proportional to the degree to which they become less distinct from
commercial banks9 5 , a situation that has substantially unfolded with
the statutory "deregulation scheme." These studies influenced the
enactment of FIRA which expanded the powers of S & Ls and
credit unions to those similar to commercial banks and created the
FFIEC9 6 . The studies also contributed to further expanded powers
ofS & Ls and credit unions and to the establishment of the DIDC
under the 1980 Omnibus Banking Act9 7 and the 1982 Banking
Act" 8 . The convergence of the powers of banking institutions and the.
creation of the FFIEC and the DIDC suggest that the historical
,.development of the fragmented bank regulation may be yielding
gradually to the philosophy of regulatory consolidation".
One more specific aspect of this issue, the latest report of the
General Accounting Office, dated April 24, 1981, recommends
consolidation of the FDIC, FRB, and the Comptroller for
examination purposes1 00 . Moreover, with the recent rise of financially troubled banking institutions and the pattern of statutory
relief under the 1982 Banking Act, substantial discussion within
Congress and among the regulators will undoubtedly occur concerning the eventual consolidation of the various federal insurance
agencies (ie, the FDIC, FSLIC and the Central Liquidity Fund for
credit unions).
Debates on the issue and the various sub-issues of regulatory
consolidation will be heated and complex, particularly in light of
long standing vested interests of the regulatory authorities and also
because of the differing statutory roles of the federal authorities. This
complexity is further increased as the discussion now encompasses
the regulators of thrift institutions.
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V. THE "DEREGULATION"

SCHEME

Overshadowing (and, perhaps, ultimately controlling) the issue of
regulatory fragmentation, is the true "revolution" that involves a
process of "deregulation" within the bank industry and also
between it and that of non-bank financial institutions. Pressures for
this deregulation result from recent Congressional and regulatory
action and from rapidly changing marketplace conditions and
demands. The marketplace pressures include (i) the increasing
efforts of non-bank financial intermediaries (eg, investment bank
houses such as Merrill Lynch, insurance companies such as
Prudential, and retail creditors such as Sears and Roebuck and
American Express) to provide a broad range of financial services,
(ii) the demands of thrift institutions for increasing powers in order
to permit portfolio diversification, and (iii) reactions of commercial
banks to inter and intra-industry developments. As such, in recent
years, a significant and sustaining objective of bank regulation is
"deregulation" of the banking industry1°1 .
Essentially, deregulation (from an intra-industry perspective) is
directed toward eliminating statutory and regulatory barriers that
have divided the banking industry between commercial banks and
thrift institutions and tended to eliminate competition. More
broadly, deregulation is directed towards reducing traditional
barriers separating banking industries from non-bank financial
intermediaries.
Deregulation is primarily being effected through the easing of the
asset side (ie, new bank powers and business opportunities) and the
liability side (ie, new depositary opportunities), particularly of thrift
institutions. Ironically, this process may challenge and redefine
notions of bank "safety and soundness" and other fundamental
banking objectives and may lead to additional (but, perhaps
different) bank regulation in the attempt to deregulate (ie, may
result in a "reregulation") °2 .
A. The Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 (1980 Omnibus Banking Act)
Although FIRA commenced the statutory deregulation process, the
1980 Omnibus Banking Act set the broad foundation for the
"deregulation" of commercial banks and of the various thrift
institutions. Uniform reserve requirements were set, deposit interest
rate limitations were required to be eliminated and the
differentiation in powers among various institutions were
lessened' °3 . This statutory "deregulation" generated a new form of
competition among banks and between banks and non-banking:
financial institutions. However, it appears this process will
inevitably lead to an increase in bank failures and a "weeding out"
(through mergers or liquidations) of many of the weaker institutions.

ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW RE VIEW
The 1980 Omnibus Banking Act addressed a wide range of subject
matter from NOW (ie, negotiable order of withdrawal) accounts to
usury laws to consumer protection 0" . The following is a brief
summary of the more significant Titles of the Act:
Title I. - Monetary Control Act of 1980. Imposes uniform FRB
reserve requirements on all depository institutions. It also
requires all depository institutions to make periodic reports of
their assets and liabilities to the FRB. In addition, the FRB is
required to set a pricing schedule for Federal Reserve Bank
services: 46 FR 1338 (January 6, 1981).
Title II. - Depository Institution DeregulationAct of 1980. Provides
for the orderly phase-out and elimination of interest ceilings
under FRB Regulation Q over a 6-year period and establishes
the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee for purposes of affecting this "deregulation". It sets targets for meeting
these statutory objectives.
Title III. - Consumer Checking Account Equity Act of 1980: Authorizes a continuation of authority of banks to provide automated transfer services from savings to checking accounts,
establishes remote service units for S & Ls, provides forshare"
draft account for federally insured credit unions, extends
nationwide the authority of depository institutions to offer
NOW accounts and increases insurance of accounts in federally
insured banks, S & Ls and credit unions, from $40,000 to
$100,000.
Title IV. - Powers of Thrift Institutions and Miscellaneous Provisions.
Expands investment powers of federally chartered S & Ls,
permits them to offer credit card services and to exercise trust
and fiduciary powers, provides for the conversion of a state
;S & L to a federal counterpart and expands power of federal
mutual savings banks.
Title V. - State Usury Laws: Pre-empts state usury laws respecting
certain types of loans (eg, until April 1, 1984, unless extended,
certain mortgage loans and business and agricultural loans in
excess of $25,000 or more (subsequently amended to $1,000 or
more)). Moreover, state usury laws are pre-empted generally to
permit insured state banks, branches of foreign banks, insured
S & Ls, insured credit unions, small business investment:
companies and any other person to charge interest on loans at.a
rate of one per cent above the FRB discount rate.
Title VI. - Truth In Lending Simplfication and Reform Act: Amends
the TILA Act of 1969 for the purpose of simplifying that Act,
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the objective being to increase consumer understanding and to
facilitate creditor compliance with the provisions of the TILA.
The Act went into effect as of April 1, 1981, being implemented
by FRB Revised Regulation Z: 46 FR 20848 April 7, 1981.
Title IX. - Foreign Control of US FinancialInstitutions: Provided a
moratorium until July 1, 1980 (which was not extended)
regarding certain bank acquisitions by foreign persons.
B. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982
(1982 Banking Act).
The 1982 Banking Act, signed into law on October 15, 1982, is
another omnibus piece of legislation that continues to accelerate the
deregulation process. It complements, and is generally consistent
with, the deregulation objectives of the 1980 Omnibus Banking Act:
Pub. Law No.97-320; 96 Stat. 14 ("1982 Banking Act").
The immediate objective of the 1982 Banking Act is to provide
relief to financially troubled banking institutions through facilitating
mergers and reorganizations, expanding powers of the FDIC and
FSLIC, and establishing a federal programme whereby troubled
banks may exchange capital notes with the federal insurance
agencies to bolster their net worth. However, long-term, the significance of this Act is to expand further the loan and investment
powers of thrift institutions, to remove certain restrictions on the
lending activities of national banks, and to liberalize further the
depository abilities of all banking institutions. Although addressing,
in draft form, the Glass-Steagall investment-commercial dichotomy
and a broad pre-emption° 5 of state usury laws, the final version
omits all such provisions'
A brief summary, by Title, of each activity affected by the 1982
Banking Act follows:
Title I - Deposit Insurance Applicability (the "Depository Insurance
Flexibility Act") expands the authority of federal deFository institution's insurance agencies to assist financially distressed banking
institutions: see generally, 1982 Banking Act, §§101-142. For
example, the FDIC and FSLIC are given broadened powers as to
the forms of financial assistance such agencies may render. Further,
these agencies and the NCUA are provided with specific statutory
procedures for effecting acquisitions or merger of failed and failing
banks: 12 USC §1823 (f) (6) (B). These emergency acquisition
powers, which are subject to a three year "sunset" provision, (1982
.Banking Act S 141) are granted within a priority structure for such
acquisitions:
(i) first, between institutions of the same type within the same
state;
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(ii) second, between institutions of the same type in different
states;
(iii) third, between institutions of different types in the same
state;
(iv) fourth, between institutions of different types in different
states.
Title H - Net Worth Certificates (the "Net Worth Certificate Act"):
provides a mechanism for capital assistance for insured banks having
net worth equal to or less than three per cent of assets. Essentially, the
troubled institution issues capital instruments ("net worth certificates") that are purchased by the insuring agencies with promissory
notes. To qualify for such assistance, an insured bank must have (in
addition to meeting the three per cent ceiling) a net worth equal to orgreater than one-half per cent of its assets after the issuance of net
worth certificates. Insurance agencies having discretion to consider
special circumstances of minority are thrift institutions when considering this one-half per cent minimum requirement. Also for an
institution to be available for such assistance, it must have a mortgage portfolio equal to 20 per cent of its outstanding loans: see generally
201-206, 1982 Banking Act.
The partial formula for such capital assistance is:
Net Worth
3% or less
2% or less
1 % or less

Level of Assistance
50% of period loss
60% of period loss
70 % of period loss

The determination of a period loss is restricted to operating losses
as established by the appropriate federal insurance agency and does
not include extraordinary items for the period: 1982 Banking Act
§203.
So long as a stock bank institution has net worth certificates outstanding, the payment of dividends on its common stock is prohibited.
In the event of liquidation, the net worth certificates are to be treated
similarly to preferred stock, that is, with a higher priority than
common stock, but following other creditors: 12 USC § 1823 (i)(1).
State ihs-ured banking institutions are eligible for this capital
assistance provided the state fund that insures or guarantees the
deposits agrees to indemnify the appropriate federal insurance
agency for any losses incurred as a result of providing such assistance:
12 USC § 1823 (i) (12).
Title III - Thrift Institutions Restructuring (the "Thrift Institutions
Restructuring Act") provides increased investment powers for
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federal S & Ls and federal savings banks. These institutions now
have the authority to accept demand deposits from commercial
corporate and agricultural customers who have established a loan
relationship with them. In addition, they are given expanded real
estate and investment authority and expanded authority to invest in
commercial, corporate and agricultural loans up to a specified
percentage of assets. In terms of corporate power, these federal thrift
institutions are granted more liberal chartering options and now
have the ability to offer stock: see generally, 1982 Banking Act, §§
301-35.
This title also directs the Depository Institution Deregulation
Committee ("DIDC") to establish within 60 days of enactment ot
the Act an account that is "directly equivalent to and competitive
with money market mutual funds." Such an account would not be
considered a "transaction account" for FRB reserve requirements:
1982 Banking Act §327. On November 15, 1982, the DIDCr
established this new form of account. Generally, it is eligible to all
types of bank customers (including commercial customers); has no.
interest ceiling; requires a minimum denomination and average
monthly balance of $2,500; permits up to six account transfers a.
month without subjecting the amount to FRB reserve requirements;
is insured by the relevant federal insurance agency; and contains no
minimum maturity requirements, although there are limitations on.
the period for which a banking institution may guarantee an interest
rate1 0 6 . On December 6, 1982, the DIDC also established a new
"Super NOW" market account, which permits unlimited transactions, but which is subject to a 12 per cent reserve requirement:
47 FR 56320 (December'16, 1982).
The 1980 Omnibus Banking Act's efforts to eliminate the interest
rate differentials between banking institutions are hastened as the
DIDC is directed to eliminate all such differentials on or before
January 1, 1984: 1982 Banking Act §326.
The' Title also provides a broad (but not absolute) federal precmption of state laws and judicial decisions which restrict the enforcencnr of diw o'n sale clauses and real estate loans: 1982 Banking Act.

Title IV.- Provisions Relating to National and Member Banks affects a
number of significant provisions which revise or repeal certain of the
national banking laws. Such changes include:
(i) The single borrower lending limit is changed from 10 per
cent of a bank's capital and surplus to 15 per cent for unsecuredextensions of credit,plus an additional 10 percent for extensions of
credit fully secured by readily marketable collateral having a
reliable and continuous price quotation. The Comptroller of the
Currency is given regulatory power to determine when bank.
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commitments (as distinct from actual advances) would be
included within the term "loans and extensions of credit" for
purposes of determining compliance with the lending limit and
has the authority to promulgate "aggregation" rules respecting
when a loan putatively made to one person is attributed to
another. (1982 Banking Act 5401); see controversial proposed
Comptroller lending limit regulations at 47 FR 56862 (December
21, 1982);
(ii) The prior statutory exclusions from the single borrower
lending limit are consolidated (1982 Banking Act §401 (c));
(iii) The aggregate borrowing limitation under 12 USC $82
for national banks is repealed, although the Comptroller has the
regulatory authority to establish a limitation for purposes of
ensuring "safety and soundness (1982 Banking Act §402 (a));"
(iv) The restrictions on real estate loans by national banks
under 12 USC $371 are effectively deleted, with authority to
regulate this area resting with the Comptroller (1982 Banking Act
S403); and
(v) The Comptroller is authorized to issue certificates of authoritv
to national banking associations formed to bc "bankers' banks"
(1982 Banking Act §404).
The Title also makes significant amendments to the Federal
Reserve Act with respect to restrictions on transactions between
bank affiliates, by closing several unintended loopholes, liberalizing
certain duly restricted provisions, and simplifying the prior provisions
Amendments are also made to FIRA, primarily through the
elimination of the statutory limits on mortgage and educational
loans to executive offices of FRS member banks, by removing the
$25,000 threshold figure for the prior approval of inside loans, and
by placing authority to establish thresholds requirements with the
appropriate bank supervisory agency. In addition, certain of the
FIRA reporting requirements have been softened. However, FIRA
provisions respecting management interlocks and correspondent
bank relationships have been modified to make them more stringent:
1982 Banking Act §§421-429.
Title V - Amendments to Federal Credit Union Act effects numerous
changes to the Federal Credit Union Act in order to facilitate the
establishment and management of federal credit unions and to
provide these institutions with greater operating flexibility. A greater
operating flexibility for the NCUA and the National Credit Union
Insurance Fund and the Central Liquidity Fund is also provided.
Further, the ability of state credit unions to convert to federal credit
unions is enhanced: 1982 Banking Act §§501-533.
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Activities of Bank Holding
Title VI - Property, Casualty, Life Ins&.
Companies generally prohibits bank holding companies and their
subsidiaries from providing insurance (including property and
casualty insurance) as a principal, agent or broker subject to six
specific statutory exceptions. In effect, it limits the types of insurance
activities that could meet the "closely related" test of §4 (c) (8) of
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.
Title VII - Miscellaneous addresses minor amendments to the Truth In
Lending Act, among other matters, permits banking institutions to
offer NOW accounts and share draft accounts to state and local
governments; permits one or more banks to form a bank service
company in which they may invest up to 10 per cent of their capital
surplus (but no more than five per cent of assets); and provides a
phase-in of reserve requirements for banks that have previously
withdrawn from the Federal Reserve System: see generally 1982
Banking Act, §§ 701-712.
Title VIII - Alternative Mortgage Transactions (the "Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982") authorizes non-federally
chartered housing creditors to offer alternative mortgages in accordance with the federal regulations issued by the appropriate federal
regulatory agencies. Accordingly, these creditors will have parity
with federally chartered banking institutions respecting such mortgage
instruments. A state has three years within which to reject the authority
granted by this provision: 1982 Banking Act, §.801-807.

C. Summary of Powers of Banking Institutions
In "bottom-line," practical terms the signficance of the deregulatory
bank legislation must be translated in terms of the marketplace, that
is, the impact upon the powers (ie, business opportunities) of the
various types of banking institutions. As discussed above, from the
background of a traditionally structured and divided industry, the
banking industry has become greatly compressed and competitive
due to the drastic increases in interest rates and the efforts of noncommercial banking financial institutions to expand their financial
services and business opportunities.
Generally speaking, a banking institution has express or implied
powers. Today, these powers are:
1. Express Powers. The express powers of federal banking institutions
may include corporate, depository, business and investment, and
trust powers.
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(a) - Corporate Powers. As corporate entities, banks possess substantially similar corporate powers such as the power to make contracts,
to adopt a seal, to sue and be sued, to buy, hold and dispose of
property, and to adopt bylaws. Deregulation has made little impact
on this area, except for the facilitation of institutional conversions
and mergers.
(b) - Depository Powers. Presently federal credit unions are permitted
to pay any rate of interest on their deposits. Since 1966, federal S &
Ls have been limited by the FHLBB to paying one-quarter of one
per cent more interest than the interest rate ceilings prescribed by
the FRB (12 CFR §545.1) for FRB member banks (including all,
national banks): 12 CFR §217.7. The interest rate limitations for
S & Ls and banks were established to restrain excessive competition
for funds between banks and S & Ls and to prevent banks from:
diverting deposits from S & Ls, which would thereby create adverse
effects upon the homebuilding industry: (1980) US Code Cong. &Ad.
News 236, 238.
In enacting the 1980 Omnibus Banking Act, Congress determined
that limitations on interest rates payable on deposits discourage
savings, create inequities for depositors, impede the ability of bank-.
ing institutions to compete for funds, and do not provide an even
flow of funds for home mortgage lending. Congress also concluded
that depositors are entitled to receive a market rate of return on their
deposits: (1980) Code Cong. &Ad. News 236, 238.
Based on these tindings, the Depository Institutions Deregulation
Committee (DIDC) was established to provide an orderly elimination
of the restrictions on the maximum rates of interest that may be paid
by banks on deposits. Under the 1982 Banking Act, the interest rate
differential between commercial banks and S & Ls must be phased
out by January 1, 1984: Pub. L. No.97-230; 96 Stat. 14. Pursuant
to the 1980 Omnibus Banking Act, (Pub. L. No.96-221; 94 Stat.
132), the phase out of other limitations must be completed by March
31, 1986, at which time the DIDC dissolves.
The authority to set interest rates on deposits, formerly vested in
the FRB and the FHLBB, has been transferred to the DIDC: 12
USC §§3501 and 3502. The DIDC's decisions are binding on all
members except the NCUA, which may'choose to abide with the
decisions. The NCUA's authority to set interest rate ceilings for
credit unions expires also on March 31, 1986.
As previously discussed, the 1982 Banking Act has required the
DIDC (and the DIDC has established) a new bank depository instrument equivalent to and competitive with money market mutual funds.
(c) Lending and Investment Powers. While credit unions maintain a
competitive advantage through their ability to pay any rate of interest
on deposits, national banks possess the widest array of lending and
investment powers. They may enter into any type of lending relation-
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ship provided it does not exceed lending limits computed upon the
bank's capital accounts. Real estate loans granted by a national bank
cannot, by present regulation, exceed the greater of its capital stock
and surplus or 100 percent of its time and savings deposits. However,
new regulations pursuant to the 1982 Banking Act may eliminate this
restriction: Pub. L. No. 97 -320; 96 Stat. 14.
In contrast, federal S & Ls lending activities are presently limited
by aggregate lending limitations in several loan categories. Consumer
loans cannot exceed 30 per cent of an S & Ls assets. Loans secured by
non-residential real property cannot exceed 40 per cent of an S & Ls
assets. Education loans and business or agricultural loans cannot
exceed five per cent of the assets of a federal S & L: USC § 1464, as
amended by 1982 Banking Act.
Federal credit unions are severely limited in their lending activities
since all loans or lines of credit may be granted only to those who
qualify as members: 12 USC 51759. Federal credit unions may
offer an assortment of loans including purchase money residential
loans, mobile home loans, home improvement loans, and unsecured
loans. These loans are limited primarily by the term of maturity and
the type of collateral although loans to a member other than a natural
person cannot exceed its deposits in the credit union: 12 USC § 1757.
National banks may invest in obligations of the United States
Government and its agencies, assessment and revenue bonds issued
by states and their political sub-divisions, foreign corporate or government bonds, corporate debt instruments, and stock in corporations
that engage in bank related activities (12 USC § 24 (Seventh)). Federal
S & Ls may invest in all investments authorized for national banks
except assessment and revenue bonds issued by states and political
sub-divisions and foreign corporate or government bonds: 12 USC
S 1464 (c). Federal S & Ls may invest in personal property such as
automobiles and manufactured homes up to 10 per cent of their assets.
Federal credit unions may invest in obligations of the United States
Government and its agencies, obligations of states and their political
sub-divisions, and in stock of corporations that engage in bank related
activities: 12 USC S 1757 (72).
(d) - Trust Powers. A national bank may, upon separate application
to the Comptroller, engage in trust activities: 12 USC §92 (a).
Under the 1980 Omnibus Banking Act, federal S and Ls are now
permitted to make application to the FHLBB for express trust powers
not in contravention of state law: 12 USC § 1464 (n). Federal credit
unions have no express trust powers in the traditional sense: 12 USC
§ 1765.
2. Implied Powers. In addition to express banking powers, banks
possess powers incidental to their deposit, lending, and investment
powers. For example, national banks, by statute, are permitted tc
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exercise "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on
the business of banking.. ." Such incidental powers must be "convenient or useful" to traditional bank activities and must directly relate to
the performance of one or more express powers: 12 USC 524 (Seventh).
In this context, according to the Comptroller of the Currency, national
banks may provide free travel advice, tax return preparation, payroll
preparation, messenger service by armoured car, lease personal
property, provide data processing services and general insurance
agent services if the bank is in a locality with a population of under
5,000107
The incidental powers of a federal S & L do not arise directly from'
statute but from the following provision in their charters as required
by FHLBB regulation (12 CFR 5554 1 (a) (3)) charters as required .
by FHLBB regulation (12 CFR §554 1 (a)(3)):
...
this association shall have the power to do all things reasonably
incident to the accomplishment
performance of its express powers.

of its

express

objectives

and

the

Federal S & Ls possess the incidental power to cash cheques; to
issue cashiers' cheques, to accept funds and to remit for public utility
bills; to act as escrowee in loan and real estate transactions in which the
S & L has an interest; to conduct a safe deposit business; to salvage
loans; to prepare personal income tax forms; to collect accounts for
members in connection with a savings account; and to guarantee
customer signatures. To the extent possible under state insurance law,
10 8
a federal S & L may engage in the insurance business .
Federal credit unions are authorized, by statute, to exercise "such
incidental powers as shall be necessary or requisite to enable [them] to
carry on effectively the business for which [they are] incorporated":
12 USC § 1757 (15). The scope of such incidental powers has rarely
been the subject of regulatory orjudicial rulings. Examples of a credit
union's incidental powers include leasing office space; entering into
employment contracts; purchasing group insurance on the lives of
credit union members; and providing a safe deposit box service.
NCUA regulations permit a federal credit union to lease or to sell data
processing software 19. A credit union may also sell data processing
capacity in excess of its own capacity up to 10 per cent of its total operating income: 12 CFR §§701.27-1. NCUA regulations also set forth
rules relating to federal credit union insurance and group purchasing
activities.
Banking institutions are expanding their business opportunities
through a liberal interpretation of their "incidental powers" authority
and through the use of related corporate entities. For example, in
recent years the regulators have been receptive to an expansion of the
bank powers, either directly through broad interpretation of "incidental
powers" or indirectly through the use of service corporations or of
other related corporate entities (generally, within a holding company
unit): 12 CFR §7211 ' .
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3. Prohibited Activities. Banking institutions are prohibited, by
statutes or judicial decisions, from engaging in certain activities. For
example, federal banking institutions are precluded from guaranting
instruments in which they have no interest. In addition, they are
prohibited from becoming involved in lotteries. Further, federal law
prohibits (except through limited vehicles such as a political action
committee) federally chartered banking institutions and other corporations from making contributions or expenditures in connection with
political elections '".
VI. OTHER CURRENT ISSUES OF SIGNIFICANCE
The following is a brief attempt to highlight certain other major current
issues in the United States banking industry, most of which are interrelated with the issue of deregulation.
A. Scope of Banking Regulation
Closely associated with "deregulation" is the fundamental issue of
which financial institutions should be the proper subject of banking
regulation. There appears to be an inherent problem in defining what
constitutes a "bank." For example, large insurance companies are
acquiring investment banking houses. Investment banking houses are
expanding their services in money market funds and cash management accounts, and they are also acquiring or directing interests in
trust companies and finance companies. Large retailers are expanding
their customer services thereby offering bank-like services11 0. Although,
Congress, most likely, will not (directly) address this issue in the
immediate future, but will leave the matter to the courts, it remains
the overriding fundamental issue of bank regulations in the 1980s.
The first discussion of this issue may come within the context of application of FRB reserve requirements to certain transactions of nonbank financial intermediaries which affect FRB control of the national
money supply.
B. Branch Banking and Interstate Banking
Debate is underway with respect to amendment of the McFadden Act
of 1929 federally to pre-empt state branch banking statutes1 -3 . Closely
related to the issue of branch banking is that of interstate banking.,
Presently, major commercial banks are engaged, through various
means (eg, representative offices, Edges, finance companies, and loan
productioi. offices), in operations on an interstate basis. Moreover,
with respect to such matters as commercial lending and credit card
facilities, interstate banking exists. Further pressures for interstate
banking may lead to banks being permitted to establish in adjoining
states or areas (eg, the District of Columbia and surrounding areas) or
in acquiring failing banks in neighbouring states 1 W. The McFaddenAct appears to be beyond the embrace of direct repeal. It will most
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probably give way through the realities of the marketplace and reciprocal
state actions.
C. Glass-Steagall: Investment - Commercial Division
As financial institutions expand their services, banks and bank holding
companies are lobbying to have Congress amend the Glass-Steagall
presently prohibited under the Act 11 .
Act to allow them to provide various forms of investment services
Bank regulation has divided banking institutions from non-bank
financial intermediaries. The best example of this is the enactment of.
the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act that separates commercial banking from
investment banking (48 Stat. 162), in particular §§ 16, (12 USC 24
(Seventh)) 20, (12 USC §377) 21, (12 USC §378) and 32 (12
USC §78). Non-bank financial intermediaries have sized upon
this limitation on bank activities to offer an increasing array of financial
services and thereby compete for traditional bank customers. For
example, a major merchandise retailer now provides multi-line insurance, operates an S & L, conducts one of the largest nationwide
credit card systems, manages a money market mutual fund and owns a
large real estate brokerage firm and large securities brokerage house.
Other comparable examples involve an international services organization, investment banking house, and insurance company.
A strong movement in Congress is underway to reverse the effects
of the Glass-Steagall Act. In particular, legislation is pending which
would authorize national banks or subsidiaries of bank holding companies to underwrite municipal revenue bonds and to offer mutual
funds as part of the business of banking or as a non-banking activity of
a bank holding company subsidiary. Many commentators have
supported the removal of the Glass-Steagall barrier between commercial and investment banking on grounds that it restricts competition
and inhibits market efficiency. The securities industry, in contrast,
remains adamantly opposed to legislation expanding commercial
bank powers into the securities business. That group argues that
national banks have unfair competitive advantages over securities
firms because of their easy access to capital. Moreover, the risks
associated with the combination of commercial and investment banking activities, including the hazards identified in the judicial precedent,
remain formidable obstacles to the expansion of bank powers under
Glass-Steagall. Lacking legislative action, however, the debate over
Glass-Steagall may continue16 . S & Ls and credit unions do not
appear to come within the statutory Glass-Steagall prohibitions.
Closely associated with the investment-commercial issue is the
statutory expansion of "bank related" activities respecting bank
holding companies11 7 . Many, including the US Treasury Department,
support an expansion of these activities (including securities, insurance
and real estate) through the holding company. The rationale is that it
would permit banking units to segregate banking from non-banking
activities in a manner that would not unduly impair the "safety and
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soundness" of the banking subsidiaries.
D. Electronic Transfers and Consumer Protection
As the area of electronic fund transfer becomes more widely used and
more sophisticated in nature, there will undoubtedly be continuing
review of existing legislation to determine whether adequate safeguards are being provided for users of these services'" . The use of
electronic transfers will also affect the interstate banking issue. They
are enabling differing financial intermediaries to interconnect their
services (eg, Merrill Lynch and Bank One case management account
services). Accelerated use of electronic transfers on multi-state,
regional and national basis will also increase pressures for interstate
banking.
Also related to electronic fund transfers, is the regulation of the
cheque collecting system. Major structural changes are being made
which may entail amendment of various federal regulations: see Fed.
Res. Bull. 109, February.(1981).
E. International Banking
International banking operations, both by US banks overseas and
foreign banks in the United States, will continue to increase in the
1980s. The IBA considered many issues raised by foreign banking
operations. However, there may undoubtedly be continuing regulation
under the IBA, and perhaps additional substantive legislation in the
coming years as it becomes more and more apparent that international
banking activities are closely related to the "safety and soundness"
and efficient function of the domestic banking system and to the state
of the national economy" 9 .
For example, Congress has recently passed the Export Trading
Company Act of 1982 which establishes an export trading company
promotion office in the Department of Congress; permits bank holding company units to create and operate such companies in competition
with foreign trading companies; provides for the possibility of obtaining federal anti-trust immunity certification for such companies and
otherwise modifies the federal anti-trust laws which have restricted
export activities; and eases restrictions on banker acceptances: Pub.
Law No.92-290; 96 Stat. 1233. Remarkably, this Act has cbmpletely done away with the traditional separation of banking and
of ifis internationaI
commercial activities, at least within the context
trading vehicle.
Of immediate note are the numerous bills before Congress providing for the regulation of US bank-lending activities abroad, in
the light of the much publicized problems of restructuring US bank
loans to Poland, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina.
More generally, the whole process of bank deregulation in the
United States has significant implications for the international activities
of United States banks and for foreign banks doing business in the
United States i ab.
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F. Bank Holding Companies
With "deregulation" has come the possibility of acquisition of various
forms of banks. Opportunity for bank holding companies to expand
exists in the acquisition of failing financial institutions and of interstate branching: see Titlel, 1982 Banking Act. Moreover, as
discussed above, the bank holding company may become a primary
means for penetrating the Glass-Steagall wall and for otherwise
permitting banking institutions to become more competitive with
non-banking intermediaries.
G. Fiduciary Standards
Fiduciary standards in banks and other corporate related areas were
generally thought to be a subject of the common law and state case-law.
FIRA, however, for the first time set forth various statutory restrictions
with 'respect to inside and affiliated transactions respecting banks and
their officers, directors and other insiders. Although there presently
appears to be a predominate view that further legislation inthis area is not
appropriate, the issues of insuring fiduciary standards among bank
insiders and affiliates (particularly, if the non-bank activities of holding
company units increases) will undoubtedly be an issue of considerable
discussion during the 1980s: see Title IV, 1982 Banking Act.
H. Disclosure
There is no question that the deregulation scheme turns "topsy-turvy"
the traditional notion of "safety and soundness." As a countervailing
force, it appears to this writer that the quality (and not quantity) of
public bank disclosure will become a key issue inthe 1980s. Disclosure
will also be a central issue in such matters as domestic and international
loan participations or syndications, and the securities related activities
that may be permitted banking institutions.
VII. CONCLUSION
The 1970s was a period of significant federal legislation in banking in the
United States. The 1980s, which began with the 1980 Omnibus Banking
Act and the 1982 Banking Act, promises to be an even more active period
of federal banking legislation. Traditional notions of bank regulation will continue to be re-examined (and, perhaps, challenged).
Legal and regulatory divisions between financial institutions will further
give way. This "deregulation," in turn, will create new problems and
issues for the US Congress and the bank regulators. In addition, the
entire fragmented scheme of federal banking regulation will come under
close scrutiny. The implications and import of all these matters should be
of pressing concern to all transactors doing business in, or with, the
United States.
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